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In response to increased financial instability in many countries in
the 1990s, policy makers became interested in better understanding vul-
nerabilities in financial systems, and particularly in banks. One of the key
techniques for quantifying vulnerabilities is stress testing.
This article reviews the literature on stress testing of banking systems.
The first section introduces the concept of stress testing. The second sec-
tion overviews stress tests performed by international financial instituti-
ons, central banks, and other researchers. Thethird section describes theim-
plementation of stress tests. The fourth section discusses specific issues re-
lating to individual shock factors. The fifth section provides a conclusion.
1. The Concept of Macroprudential Stress Testing
In the context of financial sector analysis, the term stress testing refers
to a range of techniques used to help assess the vulnerability of financial
institutions or the financial system to exceptional but plausible events.1
Stress tests were originally developed for use at the portfolio level, to un-
derstand how the value of a portfolio changes if there are large changes to
its risk factors (such as asset prices). They have become widely used as
a risk management tool by financial institutions.2 In recent years, the tech-
niques have started to be applied in a broader context, with the aim of mea-
suring the sensitivity of a group of financial institutions or even an entire
financial system to common shocks.
This article focuses on macroprudential (system-focused) stress tests,
which are based on applying a common set of shocks and scenarios to a set
of financial institutions, in order to analyze both the aggregate impact and
the distribution of the impact across the institutions. Compared to stress
tests for individual institutions, the macroprudential stress tests have
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are used in areas as diverse as cardiology, engineering, and software programming.
2 The New Basel Capital Accord or “Basel II” – see (Basel Committee, 2004) – stipulates that
banks that adopt the internal ratings-based approach for calculating capital requirements must
undertake stress testing.
s_418_440  13.10.2005  17:56  Stránka 418a broader coverage (the system as a whole or large part of it), are used for
a different purpose (aggregate-level surveillance rather than risk manage-
ment in individual institutions), focus more on contagion among institu-
tions, and often use more streamlined techniques (because of the comple-
xity of the calculations).
More specifically, this article covers stress tests for banking systems,
which is where the literature has generally focused so far. This reflects
the fact that in most countries, banks are a large (and often dominant) part
of the financial system.3 Stress testing for other parts of the financial sys-
tem is relatively less well-developed, reflecting factors such as worse avail-
ability of data. Also, insurance companies are often considered to represent
a lower level of systemic risk given that their liabilities often have a longer
duration than banks; however, distress in the insurance sector can have im-
portant systemic implications, including through ownership relations with
the banking sector and its impact on confidence in the financial sector as
a whole. Recent macroprudential stress tests are therefore more likely to
include non-bank financial institutions, such as insurance companies and
pensions – e.g. (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2004).
The literature on macroprudential stress testing is in a nascent state.
Most of this literature is written by staff of international financial institu-
tions and central bank staffers. This reflects the fact that it is a newer con-
cept as well as the fact that it requires comprehensive data for a number
of financial institutions, which is typically available (for confidentiality rea-
sons) only to a limited group of supervisory experts. For an introduction to
macroprudential stress tests, see (Blaschke et al., 2001), (Jones et al., 2004),
and (Sorge, 2004).4 For a general discussion of macroprudential analysis
and quantitative methods of analyzing financial systems, see for example
(Sundararajan et al., 2002), (Worrell, 2004), or (Goodhart et al., 2003).
The key element of the definition of stress testing is the notion of an “ex-
ceptional but plausible” event. Some authors view stress testing as a sub-
group of risk modeling focusing on “tail” events that is complementary to
“standard” methods such as value at risk (VaR) and should be included in
a comprehensive risk model – e.g. (Berkowitz, 1999). Others see stress test-
ing as a separate approach that goes beyond the distributions of past shocks
used in VaR and that is more an “art” than a science – e.g. (Kupiec, 2001).
The present article takes a middle road: while recognizing difficulties in-
volved in designing an “exact” stress testing scenario, especially for multi-
ple risk factors, it maintains that theselection of stress test scenarios should
be – to the extent possible – based on a measure of plausibility.
Stress tests can be classified, by methodology, into three main types:
(i) sensitivity analysis, which looks at impacts of changes in relevant eco-
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3 We use here the definition of the financial system as comprising both financial intermediaries
and financial markets. This definition seems to be prevalent in the literature – e.g. (Allen –
Gale, 2000) –, even though some authors define the financial system differently, e.g. to include
only the financial intermediaries.
4 The literature on stress testing for individual institutions is much more evolved. For an in-
troduction to stress tests for individual institutions, see (Laubsch, 2000) and (Dowd, 2002) in
English or (Jílek, 2000) and (Sekerka, 1998) in Czech. For a survey of stress testing in major
international banks, see (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2001).
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analysis, which assesses the impacts of exceptional but plausible scenarios;
and (iii) contagion analysis, which seeks to take account of the transmis-
sion of shocks from individual exposures to the system as a whole.
Stress testing is only one of a number of tools used to assess and moni-
tor strengths and vulnerabilities of banking or financial systems. To arrive
at a comprehensive financial stability assessment, one needs to combine
stress tests with other quantitative information on the financial system as
well as qualitative information on the institutional and regulatory frame-
work.5 In particular, measuring financial system soundness requires good
quantitative inputs: information on the structure of the system, general
macroeconomic indicators, and the “financial soundness indicators” (FSIs).
The FSIs are indicators of the current financial health and soundness of
the financial institutions in a country, and of their corporate and household
counterparts. They include both aggregated individual institution data and
indicators that are representative of the markets in which the financial in-
stitutions operate. Substantial efforts by the IMF and by country experts
were undertaken to develop international definitions of FSIs and to iden-
tify the core FSIs useful in most countries (Sundararajan et al., 2002), (IMF,
2004). Reflecting the large role of the banking sector in most financial sys-
tems, the core FSIs include mostly banking sector FSIs, grouped according
to six key areas of potential vulnerability in the CAMELS framework (ca-
pital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensi-
tivity to market risk).6 Most FSIs are compiled by aggregating micro-pru-
dential indicators for individual institutions to produce a measure for key
peer groups or the entire banking system. Non-bank FSIs (such as those
for the corporate and household sectors) are used to assess credit risks aris-
ing for banks from their credit and other exposures to non-bank sectors.
There are a number of important differences between stress testing and
FSIs. In particular, stress testing illustrates more clearly the potential cost
of shocks. To serve this purpose, each stress testing exercise must be tai-
lored to the features of a particular system. This higher flexibility means
that is difficult to derive a “standard” stress testing methodology compar-
able to that for compiling FSIs (IMF, 2004). Stress testing attempts to find
exposures that are latent, i.e. not obvious from the analysis of FSIs. Stress
tests try to identify exposures that are less obvious, perhaps hidden across
a wide variety of instruments, credits, and derivatives positions.
2. Stress Tests by International Financial Institutions and Central
Banks
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) have
initiated the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), which strives
to assess strengths and vulnerabilities in their member countries’ financial
420 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 9-10
5 See (Sundararajan et al., 2002), (IMF, 2003), and (IMF – World Bank, 2003).
6 The existing lists of FSIs – e.g. (IMF, 2004) – do not include indicators on management, which
reflects the fact that it is quite difficult to measure management quality on an aggregated ba-
sis.
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risdictions and provided various recommendations for improvement in
the financial system framework (many of the assessments are available on
the IMF and WB websites). From the beginning of the FSAP, stress testing
was a key element of the assessment of financial sector stability.
Stress testing in the FSAP has evolved. Most FSAP missions to date have
included single-factor sensitivity analysis based on historical extreme va-
lues, although an increasing number have also applied scenario analyses,
using multiple techniques to determine the size of shocks. While almost all
stress tests relied on data provided by the authorities, the involvement of
theauthorities in therecent FSAPmissions has gone beyond providing data,
as they have also been actively involved in designing and implementing
stress tests in the recent FSAP missions. Moreover, recent FSAP missions
to industrialized countries have aimed to improve the effectiveness of stress
tests through the use of macroeconomic models, the analysis of contagion
resulting from interbank exposures, and the involvement of major financial
institutions in the stress testing exercise (IMF – WB, 2003).
The experience of the FSAP to date suggests that the types of stress tests
need to be tailored to country-specific circumstances, the complexity of
the financial system, and data availability. In industrialized countries,
the analysis can be strengthened by using macroeconomic models (to help
calibrate the scenarios and arrive at a consistent set of assumptions for
the tests), the analysis of interbank contagion, and the involvement of ma-
jor financial institutions in the stress testing exercise. The experience also
suggests that stress tests can have a number of benefits. In particular, they
can help define the amount and nature of the data required for ongoing
monitoring of financial stability, thereby playing an important role of “ca-
pacity building.” They can also provide an independent verification of po-
tential sources of vulnerability and broaden the understanding of linkages
in the financial system (IMF – WB, 2003).
A number of central banks have recently started to conduct macropru-
dential stress tests and publish their results as part of their analyses of fi-
nancial system stability, typically called financial stability reports (FSRs).
The number of central banks publishing FSRs grew substantially (from two
in mid-1990s to about 40 at end-2004),7 and a larger share of FSRs now in-
clude summaries of stress tests increased (the share increased from zero in
mid-1990s to more than one half at end-2004). This indicates that not only
financial stability issues are gaining more prominence in central banks’
work program, but also that stress testing has increasingly become an im-
portant analytical tool in financial stability work. Table 1 is based on a re-
view of recent FSRs from 40 central banks, focusing on the features of their
stress tests. This review is based on the information available in the FSRs
published by the central banks.
Table 1 compares the stress tests in FSRs in various countries. The fact
that the analysis does not include stress tests or the fact that the stress
tests do not explicitly include certain risks does not mean that the risks are
421 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 9-10
7 In some cases, the name of the report was slightly different, e.g. Financial Stability Review.
The Czech National Bank published its first Financial Stability Report in late 2004. The report
presented results of stress tests for the banking system (Czech National Bank, 2004).












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































s_418_440  13.10.2005  17:56  Stránka 423not discussed and analyzed in the FSR. For example, even when an FSR
does not contain an explicit stress test for exchange rate risk, the report
would typically include a discussion of the open positions in foreign cur-
rency. Similarly, when a central bank does not publish an FSR or does not
include stress tests in its FSR, it may still carry out stress tests for inter-
nal purposes, without publishing the results.
There is substantial cross-country variation in the sizes and range of
shocks covered, and in the methodologies applied. The approaches vary
from more mechanical approaches to those focusing more on sources of
credit risk. Nonetheless, the stress tests in FSRs show several common
features:
– The stress tests tend to have a wide coverage of the banking sector, co-
vering either all banks or virtually all in terms of market share. Other
parts of the financial sector are covered only exceptionally.
– Virtually all presented stress tests are based on bank-by-bank data. This
can be understood as a recognition that stress tests done on aggregate
data risk are missing some potentially important risks arising from con-
centration of risks in weaker institutions.
– Credit risk is covered in almost all stress tests. Interest rate risk is cover-
ed in most stress tests. Exchange rate risk is covered in some, but in many
cases it is analyzed only in terms of open positions, without an explicit
stress test.
– Most stress tests are simple sensitivity analysis calculations. Some in-
clude scenario analysis, based on historical or hypothetical scenarios. Only
a few stress tests are based on an econometric model. When models are
used, they tend to be relatively rudimentary compared to those used in
other central bank work, such as inflation forecasting. Inclusion of indi-
rect exchange rate effects and contagion is rare. When the latter is done,
it is a basic exercise based on net interbank market exposures.
– Virtually all the surveyed FSRs have been positive in the overall assess-
ment of the financial sector, suggesting that it is stable. Stress tests, in
those FSRs that present them, tend to confirm this conclusion by finding
that the system is robust, capable to withstand substantial shocks.
– The interest in stress tests was often spurred by an FSAP mission. In
some cases, recent stability report(s) included a summary of the FSAP
stress tests (Austria, Netherlands). In other cases (Denmark, Norway),
the FSR started including “FSAP-style” stress tests in the run-up to
the FSAP participation.
3. Implementing Stress Tests
Macroprudential stress testing can be seen as a multi-step process of exa-
mining the key vulnerabilities in the system. This process involves identi-
fying the major risks and exposures in the system and formulating ques-
tions about those risks and exposures, defining the coverage and identifying
the necessary data, calibrating the shocks or scenarios applied to the data,
selecting and implementing the methodology, and interpreting the results.
424 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 9-10
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To  be relevant, stress tests must probe the consequences of potential
shocks that are related to risks faced by the economy. The process of de-
signing macroprudential stress tests therefore typically starts with a dis-
cussion of the potential macroeconomic risks. The discussion then suggests
that certain types of shocks (e.g. a substantial increase in interest rates)
are more likely in the economy than other types of shocks.
The fact that there are macroeconomic risks that could result in shocks
to the financial system does not necessarily mean that the impact of
the shocks would be large. The impact can be small if the exposures in
the system are small. It is the purpose of the stress tests to assess how
the risks combine with the exposures. The design of stress tests is often
an iterative process, since some originally identified risks may lead to re-
latively small impacts, while some risks originally assessed as small may
lead to large impacts if there are substantial exposures.
3.2 Defining Coverage and Identifying Data
Another key step in designing stress tests is defining their coverage.
The general rule is to include all systemically relevant institutions and ex-
posures. The practical issues are what types of financial institutions to in-
clude (typically banks, since they dominate most financial systems, but
sometimes also other institutions, such as insurance companies) and how
to include foreign-owned financial institutions (a typical solution is to in-
clude subsidiaries but exclude branches of foreign-owned financial institu-
tions). In terms of exposures, the most frequently covered are exposures to
credit risk and market risks, and sometimes also liquidity risk and inter-
bank contagion risk. Thechoice of coverage then determines thedata needed
for the calculation. In some cases, the lack of data (e.g., on institution-to-
-institution exposures) can limit some of the stress testing calculations.
3.3 Calibrating Shocks and Scenarios
There are two ways of asking questions about exposures in the financial
system. The first way is to ask, for a given level of plausibility, what sce-
nario has the worst impact on the system (“the worst case approach”).
The second way is to ask, for a given impact on the system, what is the most
plausible combination of shocks that would need to occur to have that im-
pact (“threshold approach”). These two approaches are just two different
ways of presenting the same vulnerabilities in the system.
Figure 1 shows the process of scenario selection under the worst case ap-
proach and the threshold approach, for a simplified case when there are
only two risk factors (one can, for example, think of changes in the interest
rate and the exchange rates). Each ellipse depicts the set of combinations
of the two risk factors with the same probability of occurrence. The shape
of the ellipse reflects the correlation between the two factors, and its size
425 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 9-10
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The diagonal lines depict combinations of the risk factors leading to the same 
overall impact, measured here by a change in the system’s capital adequacy
ratio (CAR). The impact increases with the size of the shocks to the risk
factors, so the CAR decreases in the northeast direction. The diagonal lines
do not have to be straight; they are only depicted here as such for simpli-
city. Figure 1 illustrates that the worst case approach and the threshold ap-
proach are two essentially equivalent ways of analyzing the same problem.8
The worst case approach starts with selecting a level of plausibility (e.g.,
1% ), and searching for the combination of shocks with this level of plausi-
bility that have the worst impact on the portfolio. This means searching for
the point on the largest ellipse that lies as far northeast as possible. In Fi-
gure 1, this is point A.
The threshold approach starts with selecting the threshold, i.e. the dia-
gonal line; it then searches for the most plausible (i.e., smallest) shocks
reaching this threshold. This is straightforward if there is only one risk fac-
tor; if there are two risk factors, one needs to take into account the corre-
lation between the risk factors. For the specific correlation pattern in Fi-
gure 1, selecting a threshold of zero capital adequacy would lead again to
the combination of shocks corresponding to point A.
Establishing the plausibility level of a scenario can be difficult in prac-
tice, given that the scenario should be a low probability, “tail” event. For
risk factors with good time series of historical data (in particular, for mar-
ket risks), the natural starting point is to base the scenarios on the past
volatility and covariance patterns. Calibrating the shocks is particularly
straightforward for single-factor stress tests: an exchange rate shock can
be based on 3 standard deviations of past exchange rate changes (corres-
ponding roughly to a 1% confidence level). With multiple risk factors, one
needs also to look at thecovariance statistics of thevariables, or use stochas-
tic simulations based on macroeconomic models. Such calculations are sub-
ject to a number of caveats mentioned earlier. In particular, models can
426 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 9-10
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can help to find a first-cut approximation of stress test scenarios.
Another practical approach to scenario selection is to base the stress tests
on an extreme historical scenario. This approach makes it possible to 
specify relatively complex stress tests with a number of risk factors. For
Asian countries, for example, such a scenario might be the 1997 crisis; 
for the Czech Republic, it might be the 1997 exchange rate turbulence and
the ensuing recession.9 The advantage of this approach is that it is quite il-
lustrative, simple to implement, and it is plausible (because such a crisis
already happened). Its disadvantage is that it may be difficult to assess
the exact plausibility level of such a crisis, and it can be doubted whether
future crises will simply repeat the past.
In practice, future crises can go beyond historical experience. While some
authors argue that stress tests should be based only on historical variance
and covariance patterns (Berkowitz, 1999), most seem to agree that there
can be plausible scenarios that have not yet happened. New crises may in-
clude, for example, new concentrations of risk emerging through cross-
-market linkages not present in the past. Specifying a hypothetical scenario
means simulating shocks that are suspected to be more likely to occur 
than historical observation suggests (or that have never occurred); or re-
flect a structural break that could occur in the future. The scenario selec-
tion in hypothetical scenarios is the same as presented in Figure 1, i.e. it
is based on (at least implicit) probability distribution, but the probability
distribution is different from the distribution of past observations.
The easiest case in this context is if the hypothetical scenarios indicate
that the exposures are small. In this case, the “threshold” approach is a use-
ful presentation tool: for example, if one asks what shocks are needed to
make a substantial impact on the financial system and finds that the shocks
would have to be several times larger than the largest shocks observed so
far, the stress testing scenario provides an important conclusion, namely
that the financial system is not very exposed to the risks considered in
the scenario. In this case, the extremely low plausibility of the stress test-
ing scenario is actually an advantage, because it helps to make the case
that the system is very robust.
A practical possibility for presenting hypothetical scenarios is to combine
a historical scenario (e.g. a large crisis that happened in the past) with sen-
sitivity analysis (i.e. alternative assumptions about individual shocks). This
approach is still open to the criticism that the level of plausibility of these
scenarios is unclear, but it at least provides an anchor (in the form of the his-
torical scenario) and an assessment of the robustness of the scenario’s re-
sults with respect to changes in the model assumptions.
3.4 Selecting and Implementing Methodology
Once a set of adjustment scenarios have been produced in a consistent
macro framework, the next step is to translate the various outputs into
the balance sheets and income statements of financial institutions. There
427 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 9-10
9 The design of stress tests for the Czech Republic is discussed in more detail in (âihák, 2004).
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the “bottom-up” approach, where the impact is estimated using data on in-
dividual portfolios, and the “top-down” approach, where the impact is esti-
mated using aggregated data. The bottom-up approach should generally
lead to more precise results, but it may be hampered by insufficient data
and by calculation complexities. Thedisadvantage of thetop-down approach
is that applying the tests only to aggregated data could disguise concen-
tration of exposures at the level of individual institutions that could lead
to failures of these institutions and then contagion to the rest of the sys-
tem. Most macroprudential stress tests therefore try to combine the ad-
vantages and minimize the disadvantages of the bottom-up and top-down
approaches.
The methodologies for individual shocks are discussed in more detail in
Section 4. As a general point, when attempting to identify measurement
techniques, it is important to understand where exposures may generate
losses in the financial system. This requires estimating where these expo-
sures are recorded as positions either on or off the balance sheets of the in-
stitutions. In particular in more developed financial systems, finding the ex-
posures may require understanding the details of the risk transfers that
have occurred through derivatives and securitization activities.
Isolating the exposures that generate stress loss estimates often requires
that institutions “slice and dice” their on- and off-balance sheet positions
into sector specific decompositions that they may not typically monitor. Ex-
posure estimates that relate to shocks to a specific economic sector may be
obtained by aggregating the exposures from a customized decomposition of
a financial institution’s alternative activities. For example, a decline in
the output of an important industry may be reflected in the stress test by
direct loan and bond related losses on credits extended to this industry, by
an equity market price shock to investments in firms in this industry, by
a rise in consumer credit and mortgage related losses to the extent that
wages and employment are adversely affected by the shock, and by losses
on the banking and insurance industries’ off-balance sheet positions, as
counterparties default on their obligations in response to the shock.
3.5 Interpreting Results
Stress tests should be interpreted as rough indicators of exposures rather
than as forecasts of financial institutions’ failures. By their nature, stress
tests focus on extreme events, not on the most probable events. Also, stress
test estimates, no matter how technical the model used, are at best only
first order approximations of the true potential loss exposure.
When interpreting stress tests, their limitations and assumptions need
to be taken into account. An important limitation of stress tests is that they
typically assume no reaction by the institutions or supervisors. They view
financial institutions as static portfolios rather than actively behaving 
units. A complete examination of vulnerabilities, however, must take into
account also the fact that financial institutions adapt dynamically to shocks
in the environment. Depending on the incentives that financial institutions
face, these adaptations may exacerbate or mitigate the impact of the initial
428 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 9-10
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nancial system may face, it is necessary to look at the institutional envi-
ronment, such as the corporate governance arrangements in financial in-
stitutions; the legal, accounting, tax, and regulatory conditions; and how
claim holders on financial institutions may react in the bond and equity
markets to actions that financial institutions take – see (Chai – Johnston,
2000).
Another limitation of stress tests is that they typically consider only apart
of a financial institution’s income generating operations. Financial institu-
tions may have positions in assets that are unaffected under the specific
stress scenarios analyzed. In particular, given their focus on financial as-
set and derivative value changes, stress testing calculations tend to ignore
the importance of fee income and other financial institution income sources
that are not formally “capitalized” on a financial institution’s balance sheet
or recognized in off-balance sheet position reports. The income from these
operations might offset the losses that would arise in the stress scenario
envisioned.
Finally, stress tests are typically based on marking-to-market, while regu-
latory capital requirements often rely on book values. Therefore, financial
institutions may suffer substantial mark-to-market losses on their banking
book assets without recording any adverse effect on their regulatory capi-
tal position. They can often remain open and avoid default as long as regu-
lators allow them to continue operating, even if they are insolvent on amark-
-to-market basis. Therefore, while mark-to-market loss estimates are in-
formative as to an institution’s financial risk exposures, they may be less
informative about the ability of a financial institution to sustain losses and
remain a going concern.
4. Specific Methodological Issues
This section will turn to methodological issues relating to the individual
risk factors (in particular, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk, and credit
risk) and to the modeling of interbank contagion. With the exception of in-
terbank contagion risk, an introductory exposition is provided in (Blaschke
et al., 2001).
4.1 Exchange Rate Risk: “Stress Testing 101“
Exchange rate risk is the risk that exchange rate changes affect the local
currency value of financial institutions’ assets, liabilities, and off-balance
sheet items. Exchange rate risk consists of a direct risk, arising from posi-
tions in foreign currency (and those in local currency that are indexed to
exchange rates), and an indirect risk, resulting from the impact of foreign
exchange positions taken by borrowers on their creditworthiness and abili-
ty to repay, and thereby on financial institutions.
The direct exchange rate risk can be assessed using the net open position
in foreign exchange, one of the “core FSIs,” defined in (IMF, 2004). The di-
rect exchange rate risk is arguably the simplest part of stress tests. To il-
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change, C the capital, ARW the risk-weighted assets (all in domestic currency
units), and e the exchange rate in units of foreign currency per unit of do-
mestic currency. Adepreciation (decline) in the exchange rate leads to a pro-
portional decline in the domestic currency value of the net open position,
i.e.  e/e =  F/F (for F   0). Let us assume, for simplicity, that this trans-
lates directly into a decline in capital, i.e.  C/ F =1 . 10 The impact of the ex-
change rate shock on the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets would then
be:
F  ARW F
–– ARW – C –––– ––
 [C(e)/ARW(e)]     e  C    e     1  F    C          ARW C
––––––––––––   ––––––––––––––––   – –– –––  1 – –––– ––––   (1)
 e                          ARW
2 e  C ARW  C    ARW
which uses the fact that  C/ e =  F/ e = F/e. The symbol “ ” means that
the equation is only approximate for larger than infinitesimal changes.
Equation (1) can be rewritten as
 e  F    C           ARW C
 [C(e)/ARW(e)]   –– –– ––––  1 – –––– ––––  (2)
e   C  ARW  C    ARW
The term  ARW/ C can have values from 0 to 1, reflecting the degree of
co-movement of capital and the risk weighted assets.11 In the special case
of  ARW/ C = 0, i.e. if the risk-weighted assets do not change, the change
in the capital adequacy ratio equals simply the exchange rate shock times
the exposure, measured as a product of the net open position to capital (F/C)
and capital adequacy (C/ARW), both of which are “core FSIs” as defined by
IMF (2004). This is sometimes used as a short-hand calculation of the di-
rect exchange rate stress test. It should be noted that (2) holds only as a li-
near approximation, which works well if foreign exchange portfolios are es-
sentially linear. However, if financial institutions have large positions in
foreign exchange options, the relationship between the exchange rate
change and the impact on capital can become highly non-linear. In such
cases, stress tests based on detailed decomposition of financial institutions’
open positions are a superior analytical tool.12
The indirect exchange rate risk is often more significant than the direct
one, because the direct exposure is relatively easy to measure and there-
fore to manage and regulate, while it is typically much more difficult to
monitor the foreign exchange vulnerabilities of financial institutions’ coun-
terparties. Especially in countries with fixed or heavily managed exchange
rates, firms and households can be lulled by the perceived absence of ex-
change rate risk and enter into large open positions in foreign exchange. In
some of these countries, regulators have started to ask financial institu-
430 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 9-10
10An alternative, and arguably more realistic, approach would be to deduct the impact first from
profits (if any), and then from capital. See (âihák, 2004) for a discussion of the treatment of
profits in stress tests.
11 Empirically,  ARW/ C could be estimated by a regression.
12 As a general point, stress tests should include all relevant off-balance sheet items.
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The information gathered in this way is useful, but it does not cover, for ex-
ample, foreign exchange exposures in the household sector, credit to which
has been growing rapidly in some countries. âihák (2004) includes an exam-
ple of the calculation of the indirect exchange rate risk.
Exchange rate risk was analyzed in almost all FSAP missions. Half of
them calculated the impact on the net open foreign exchange position for
individual institutions or for groups of financial institutions, which in turn
was calibrated in terms of impact on capital. Regressions and Monte Carlo
simulations to determine the effect of exchange rate changes on credit qua-
lity (NPLs) were applied in about 40 percent of the FSAP missions (IMF –
WB, 2003).
4.2 Interest Rate Risk
Interest rate risk is the exposure of a financial institution’s financial con-
dition to adverse movements in interest rates. Interest rate changes affect
interest income and interest expenses as well as the balance sheet through
changes in market prices of financial instruments. Sources of interest rate
risk are discussed in (Basel Committee, 2001).
The impact of changes in the interest rate on net interest income is ty-
pically measured using the “repricing gap” model. The model allocates in-
terest-bearing assets and liabilities into buckets according to their time to
repricing, and the gap between assets and liabilities in each bucket is used
to estimate the net interest income exposure to interest rate changes – see
(Blaschke, 2001) for practical examples. The position in interest-based fi-
nancial derivatives can be incorporated into this analysis by recalculating
the expected future receipts and payments as interest rates change.
There are two commonly used approaches to measuring the effect of in-
terest rate changes on market prices of financial instruments: the duration
model and the “gap” model. Duration, defined as the weighted average term
to maturity of assets/liabilities, is a direct measure of the interest rate elas-
ticity of an asset or liability.13 The higher the duration, the more sensitive
the price of an asset or liability to changes in interest rates,
 A(rA)     – DA rA  L(rL)     – DL rL –––––   –––––––,    –––––   ––––––– (3)
A(rA)       (1 + rA)       L(rL)       (1 + rL)
where A(rA) and L(rL) are market values of assets and liabilities, and rA and
rL are annual interest rates on assets and liabilities (Bierwag, 1987). This
feature of duration can be used to summarize the impact of interest rate
changes on financial institutions’ capital. In particular, capital can be de-
fined as A(rA)–   L(rL), and expressed as a ratio to risk weighted assets.14
Differentiating capital with respect to the interest rate on assets, and sub-
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wag (1987) derives the impact on profits in the case of a single bank.
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can be expressed as:
 ARW C
1 – ––––– –––
 [C(rA, rL)/ARW(rA)]       (L/ARW)               1 + rA  rL ARW     C   
–––––––––––––––   – ––––––  DA – DL ––––– –––   ––––––––––– (4)
 rA 1 + rA 1 + rL  rA  AC   
1 – ––– –––
A  C 
(L/ARW)
  – –––––– GAPD
1 + rA
where the approximation on the second line assumes that the risk-weighted
assets move proportionately to total assets, i.e.  ARW/ARW =  A/A. GAPD is
the duration gap, defined as:
1 + rA  rL GAPD = DA – DL ––––– ––– (5)
1 + rL  rA
The formulas (3) and (4) are linear approximations that hold exactly for
small changes in interest rates. For large changes in interest rates (typi-
cally assumed in stress tests), it is necessary to take into account nonli-
nearity, as duration can change with large changes in interest rates. Given
that the price-yield relationship is convex rather than linear, duration ty-
pically overpredicts the fall in prices for large interest rate increases and
underpredicts the increases in prices for large interest rate declines. A new
parameter (named CX for “convexity”) can be specified and estimated which
increases the precision of the estimates of the changes in the value of as-
sets and liabilities:15
 A(rA)    – DA rA CXA  L(rL)     – DL rL CXL –––––   ––––––– + –––– ( rA)2,  –––––   ––––––– + –––– ( rL)2 (6)
A(rA)      (1 + rA)       2                L(rL)       (1 + rL)       2
An alternative approach to assessing the price revaluation effect of an in-
terest rate shock is to use “gap” analysis. Under this approach, expected
payments on assets and liabilities are sorted into time “buckets” according
to the time to repricing for floating-rate instruments, and the time until
payments are due on fixed-rate instruments. The net present value of as-
sets and liabilities can be derived by discounting the net cash flows in each
time bucket, and the effect of an interest rate shock estimated by redis-
counting the net cash flows using the changed interest rates. IMF (2004)
provides a template for conducting such a gap analysis.
Interest rate risk was analyzed in the majority of the FSAP missions. Re-
flecting data constraints, most FSAPs used maturity buckets and gap ana-
lysis. Some used more advanced techniques based on duration or VaR. About
25 percent of FSAP missions did not obtain data on maturity buckets or du-
ration and used income statement data instead to calculate simple ear-
nings at risk (IMF – WB, 2003).
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Credit risk is the loss associated with unexpected changes in credit qua-
lity. Despite innovations in banking, credit risk is typically the most sig-
nificant source of risk. Credit risk arises mostly from loans, but also from
positions in corporate bonds or from over-the-counter transactions that in-
volve the risk of a counterparty default.
Measuring credit risk involves estimation of a number of different pa-
rameters: the likelihood of default on each instrument both on average and
under extreme conditions; the extent of the losses in the event of default,
which may involve estimating the value of collateral; and the likelihood that
other counterparties will default at the same time.
There are two general approaches to macroprudential stress tests for
credit risk. First are approaches based on loan performance data (i.e. on
the classification of loans into the various categories of performing and non-
performing loans). Second are approaches based on data on borrowers,
which are typically balance sheet or income statement data about financial
institutions’ borrowers.
More than half of the FSAP missions used NPL-based approaches to mo-
deling credit risk. About 60 percent of the missions used ad-hoc NPL mi-
gration. About 30 percent of the missions applied regression analyses to exa-
mine the impact of potential macroeconomic shocks on the behavior of NPLs
(IMF – WB, 2003).
4.3.1 Approaches Based on Loan Performance Data
The advantage of loan performance data is that they are readily avail-
able to supervisors. Also, they are available for all sectors, including
the household sector, for which it is difficult to obtain reliable balance sheet
or income statement information. The key disadvantage of this approach is
that NPLs are lagging indicators of asset quality.
The first subgroup of these approaches are those based on asset reclassi-
fication, i.e. those that model a transition of loans (and similar assets) one
or more classification categories down. The effect of the asset reclassifica-
tion on the capital adequacy ratio is calculated after deducting the addi-
tional provisions from capital and from assets. There are various types of
asset reclassification, purely mechanical (e.g. a percentage of loans in each
category is moved down by a category), or based on experience with past
crises (e.g. the same loan reclassification as happened during a recent cri-
sis). If sufficiently detailed information is available, the reclassification can
be based on “peer reviews” whereby loans to the same borrower from dif-
ferent institutions are reclassified according to the lowest grade assigned
by an institution. Another version of this approach are “supervisory peer
reviews”: for example, if recent on-site examinations in some financial in-
stitutions uncovered significant discrepancies between reported and “true”
classification of loans, a stress test could assess what would happen if simi-
lar discrepancies were present in other institutions.
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an econometric model including NPLs and a number of macroeconomic fac-
tors, such as real interest rates, GDP growth, and terms of trade changes.16
The model can be a single equation regression, a vector auto-regression, or
a structural model, but the first two approaches are more common. The re-
gressions can be run on the level of economic sectors (if there are sectoral
data on NPLs) or even on the individual financial institution level (to cap-
ture the financial institutions’ different sensitivities to macroeconomic de-
velopments). However, the institution-by-institution approach can be too
resource intensive. It is therefore more common to estimate regressions for
aggregated data and to apply the estimated parameters into institution-by-
-institution calculations based on the individual financial institutions’ po-
sitions (to use the terminology introduced earlier, this is a combination of
a top-down approach with the bottom-up approach). Typical problems with
the regression approach include the lack of long and consistent time series
data on NPLs. Even where the data are available for a long time period,
they may exhibit structural breaks due to changing definitions of NPLs or
policy changes.
4.3.2 Approaches Based on Data on Borrowers
The advantage of borrower data is that they can provide more substance
to the credit risk stress test by allowing to explicitly model linkages between
the health of the real sector and the banking sector. Another advantage is
that borrower data can help to indicate problems in the loan portfolio ear-
lier than the loan classification. A disadvantage is that borrower data (in
particular for households and small enterprises) are often difficult to ob-
tain and are typically available only with long lags.
Cross-country calculations suggest that leverage (i.e. the ratio of borrow-
ers’ debt and equity) is a good predictor for the ratio of gross NPLs to total
loans (NPL ratio). A panel data estimate included in (IMF, 2003) suggests
that a 10 percentage point increase in corporate leverage is associated with
a 1.8 percentage point rise in the NPL ratio after one year; and a 1 per-
centage point rise in GDP growth results on average in a 2.6 percentage
point decline in the NPL ratio.
There is a wide range of approaches to modeling credit risk using bor-
rower data. A relatively elaborate approach is to estimate a model predict-
ing individual company bankruptcy probabilities as a function of company
age, size, industry characteristics, and corporate soundness indicators (le-
verage, earnings, liquidity, financial strength) of a borrower. To capture
the indirect risk, the model should include interest and exchange rates
among explanatory variables. Individual financial institutions are linked
to the exercise through their exposures to the various groups of companies
(e.g., using a decomposition of their lending by industries). This can then
be used to predict financial institutions’potential losses (taking into account
collateral). (Eklund et al., 2001) is an example of a model of this type, used
by the Bank of Norway.
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direct effect is more complex and dependent on additional assumptions or
regression analysis. The calculation of the indirect effect needs to include
the impacts on stocks as well as on flows. It must reflect the impact of ex-
change rate changes on the net present value of the corporate sector, which
means taking into account changes in the net present value of future ear-
nings. For example, in export-oriented companies, a depreciation can be ex-
pected to increase their future earnings. In terms of the net present value,
the effect would be essentially equivalent to the impact of a long position
in foreign currency. However, it may be more practical to calculate the im-
pact on flows, by estimating the elasticity of earnings to interest and prin-
cipal expenses with respect to theexchange rate, and then to estimate there-
lationship between this FSI and the NPL ratio. Alternatively, one can look
at an indicator measuring the corporate sector’s flow exposure, e.g. the ra-
tio of earnings in foreign exchange to interest and principal expenses in fo-
reign exchange.
4.4 Other Risks
Of other risk factors, liquidity risk – the risk that assets are not readily
available to meet a demand for cash – is the most important one. Modeling
liquidity risk is often considered to be much more difficult than modeling
interest rate or exchange rate risk. Many central banks therefore rely on
the liquidity stress tests conducted by the financial institutions themselves.
The results of these stress tests are reported off-site, which is followed up
by integrity checks during on-site visits.
The most challenging step in designing a liquidity stress test is identify-
ing which assets that are normally considered liquid may become illiquid
in periods of financial stress. (IMF, 2004) provides operational guidelines
for defining liquid assets and liquid liabilities which could be used as
the starting point for conducting stress tests. A straightforward approach
to stress testing the liquidity risk is to shock the value of liquid resources
by a certain percentage or amount. The percentage or amount could be de-
termined based on past bank runs or on a rule of thumb, and it should ge-
nerally be different for different maturities. A rule of thumb used by some
supervisors is that a financial institution should be able to survive at least
five days of a moderate liquidity run without outside support. The reason
behind this choice of threshold is that this would make it possible for the fi-
nancial institution to survive till the weekend, when they are closed for
business. This “cooling-off” period would enable the institution and its su-
pervisors to better assess the situation and, where appropriate, take ne-
cessary actions.
Other shocks include adverse changes in equity prices, real estate prices,
and commodity prices. Equity price risk is modeled in a similar way to di-
rect exchange rate risk. The calculation is based on the net open position
in equities, which is defined in a similar fashion to the net open position in
foreign exchange (IMF, 2004). Exposure to real estate price risk consists of
(i) the direct exposure (investment in real estate), (ii) credit exposures (e.g.
lending to real estate developers), and (iii) risk resulting from the degree
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should be seen in relation to the credit risk; it increases with the loan-to-
-value ratio (i.e. the ratio of the outstanding loan to the value of the colla-
teral) and with the default probability. Finally, stress tests for commodity
price risk have been carried out in some FSAP missions and by some cen-
tral banks, notably in developing countries, where trade in commodities is
important (IMF – WB, 2003). 
4.5 Interbank Contagion Stress Test
Interbank stress testing complements the standard set of stress tests by
measuring the risk that the failure of a bank or a group of banks triggers
failures of other banks in the system. There are a number of interbank con-
tagion channels. The most direct one is contagion through uncollateralized
interbank lending, an important transmission channel during theAsian cri-
sis. Other plausible channels of contagion include reputational effects,
whereby a perceived stability problem in a bank could make it difficult or
more expensive for other banks in the system to borrow liquidity in inter-
national markets. The reputational effect of a failure of a bank can also lead
to liquidity runs on other banks that are perceived as weak. Conceptually,
modeling reputational effects is similar to modeling contagion through lend-
ing exposures. Empirically, however, it is easier to measure the exposures
in terms of interbank lending rather than those in terms of reputational
risk. âihák (2004b) offers a discussion of proxy variables to assess the re-
putational contagion.
There are two basic types of interbank contagion stress tests: (i) pure
interbank stress test, where the shock is the failure of one bank, triggered
for example by fraud, and where the impact on other banks in the system
is through the interbank exposures; (ii) integrated interbank stress test,
where the banking system is first subjected to macroeconomic shocks or
scenarios and if these shocks or scenarios trigger a failure of a bank or
a group of banks, the interbank stress test is run to assess the impact of
additional failures through interbank exposures, as in the pure interbank
stress test.
The key element of all interbank contagion calculations is a matrix of bi-
lateral interbank exposures (Table 2). In this matrix, the cell in the i-th row
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TABLE 2 Matrix of Bank-to-Bank Exposures
Bank 1 Bank 2 ... Bank n
Bank 1 -- -- Net exposure of  . . . Net exposure of
bank 1 to bank 2 bank 1 to bank n
Bank 2 Net exposure of  -- -- ... Net exposure of 










Bank n Net exposure of  Net exposure of  ... -- --
bank n to bank 1 bank n to bank 2
s_418_440  13.10.2005  17:56  Stránka 436and j-th column contains the net uncollateralized lending from bank i to
bank j, covering all on- and off-balance sheet exposures.
Let us focus on the “pure” interbank contagion stress test, which aims to
estimate the impact of the failure of a bank or group of banks on the sys-
tem. The test assumes that there is a failure in a bank (say, Bank 1), for
instance due to fraud. The first round of the contagion calculation would
derive the direct impact of Bank 1’s failure on each of the other banks, as-
suming Bank 1 would not repay its uncollateralized interbank exposures
(or part of the exposures). If some banks fail as a result of Bank 1’s fai-
lure,17 the second round of the calculation would derive the impact on each
of the remaining banks of these newly failed banks not repaying their un-
collateralized interbank exposures. The process can be repeated for a third
time if there are new failures after the second run, and so on. Concrete exam-
ples of such interbank contagion tests and their results can be found in
(Furfine, 2003) for US banks, in (Wells, 2002) for UK banks, in (Blåvarg –
Nimander, 2002) for Swedish banks, and in (Elsinger – Lehar – Summer,
2002) for Austria.
Two indicators of systemic risk can be calculated from the output of
thepure interbank stress test: (i) afrequency of bank failure indicator, which
is the ratio of the cumulative number of failures to the number of banks in
the system, (ii) statistical measures of the impact on bank system capital
(e.g., mean, distribution, and quartiles). Specifically, one can define a “sys-
temic risk index”, the average reduction in capital ratios of banks in the sys-
tem triggered by a failure of a bank. Such a measure could be computed for
all banks in the system and used to rank them by their systemic impor-
tance. For an interesting example of presenting the network structure of
the interbank market, see (Boss et al., 2004) for the case of Austria.
5. Conclusions
Macroprudential stress testing is a rapidly developing area of financial
sector analysis. The usefulness of macroprudential stress tests derives from
the fact that they provide a quantitative measure of the vulnerability of
the financial system to substantial changes in risk factors. This can be used
in combination with other analytical tools to draw conclusions about
the overall stability of a financial system.
The methodology of macroprudential stress testing is, as illustrated in
this review, far from standardized. This lack of standardization partly re-
flects the fact that stress testing of financial systems is still a new and
rapidly developing area. It also reflects the fact that stress tests need to be
tailored to individual circumstances, depending on the prevailing macro-
economic risks in a country, the structure of its financial system, and data
availability. For these reasons, stress tests can hardly be as comparable
among countries as national accounts data (in macroeconomic analysis) or
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stress tests can still substantially contribute to understanding financial sys-
tem vulnerabilities. In particular, if they are performed regularly and thede-
velopment of their results over time is analyzed, stress tests can help as-
sess how the risk profile of the financial system is changing over time, and
can indicate possible sources for concern.
Judging from the growing number of central banks and other agencies in
various countries that have recently started carrying out macroprudential
stress tests, this stream of literature is likely to grow for some time. A key
issue for future work is to improve credit risk modeling, which requires
much better data on borrowers as well as further advances in the me-
thodology. Related topics include improvements in modeling of indirect 
exchange rate risk and indirect interest rate risks, and contagion among
banks as well as between non-bank financial institutions and banks.
REFERENCES
ALLEN, F. – GALE, D. (2000) Comparing Financial Systems. Cambridge, London, MIT, 2000.
Austrian National Bank (2004): Financial Stability Report, no. 7, June 2004.
Banco de Portugal (2004): The Banking System in the First Half of 2004. Banco de Portugal,
Economic Bulletin, September 2004.
Bank of England (2003): Financial Stability Review, December 2003.
Bank of Slovenia (2004): Financial Stability Report for 2003. June 2004.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001): Principles for the Management and Supervi-
sion of Interest Rate Risk. Basel, Bank for International Settlements, 2001.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004): Basel II: International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm
BERKOWITZ, J. (1999): A Coherent Framework for Stress-Testing. Washington, Board of Go-
vernors of the Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, July 1999.
BESSIS, J. (2003): Risk Management in Banking. Second Edition. J. Wiley & Sons, 2003.
BIERWAG, G. (1987): Duration Analysis. Harper & Row, Cambridge (Mass.), 1987.
BLASCHKE, W. – JONES, M. – MAJNONI, G. – MARTINEZ PERIA, S. (2001): Stress Testing
of Financial Systems: An Overview of Issues, Methodologies, and FSAP Experiences. Washing-
ton, International Monetary Fund, Working Paper, no. 01/88.
BLÅVARG, M. – NIEMANDER, P. (2002): Inter-bank Exposures and Systemic Risk. Sveriges
Bank, Economic Review, no. 2/2002.
BOSS, M. (2002): A Macroeconomic Credit Risk Model for Stress Testing the Austrian Credit
Portfolio. Austrian National Bank, Financial Stability Report, 2002, no. 4.
âIHÁK, M. (2004a): Stress Testing: A Review of Key Concepts. CNB, Internal Research Policy
Note, no. 2/2004.
âIHÁK, M. (2004b): Designing Stress Tests for the Czech Banking System. CNB, Internal Re-
search Policy Note, no. 3/2004.
CHAI, J. – JOHNSTON, R. (2000): An Incentive Approach to Identifying Financial System Vul-
nerabilities. Washington, International Monetary Fund, Working Paper, no. 00/211.
Committee on the Global Financial System (2001): A Survey of Stress Tests and Current Prac-
tice at Major Financial Institutions. Basel, Bank for International Settlements, 2001.
Czech National Bank (2004): Financial Stability Report 2004.
Danmarks Nationalbank (2003): Financial Stability 2003.
Deutsche Bundesbank (2004): Report on the Stability of the German Financial System, Monthly
Report, October 2004.
De Nederlandsche Bank (2004): Overview of Financial Stability in the Netherlands, December
2004, no. 1.
438 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 9-10
s_418_440  13.10.2005  17:56  Stránka 438DOWD, K. (2002): An Introduction to Market Risk Measurement. John Wiley & Sons, 2002.
EKLUND, T. – LARSEN, K. – BERHARDSEN, E. (2001): Model for Analysing Credit Risk in
the Enterprise Sector. Bank of Norway Economic Bulletin, no. Q3/2001.
ELSINGER, H. – LEHAR, A. – SUMMER, M. (2002): A New Approach to Assessing the Risk of
Interbank Loans. Austrian National Bank, Financial Stability Report, 2002, no. 3.
European Central Bank (2004): Financial Stability Review, December 2004.
FURFINE, C. (2003): Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion. Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 35, 2003, no. 1.
GOODHART, C. A. E. – SUNIRAND, P. – TSOMOCOS, D. P. (2003): A Model to Analyse Fi-
nancial Fragility. Oxford Financial Research Centre Working Paper, no. 2003fe13.
International Monetary Fund (2003): Financial Soundness Indicators – Background Paper.
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/2003/051403b.htm
International Monetary Fund (2004): Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness Indicators.
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/2004/guide/index.htm
International Monetary Fund – the World Bank (2003): Analytical Tools of the FSAP.
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/2003/022403a.pdf
JÍLEK, J. (2000): Finanãní rizika. Praha, Grada, 2000.
JONES, M. – HILBERS, P. – SLACK, G. (2004): Stress Testing Financial Systems: What to Do
When theGovernor Calls. Washington, InternationalMonetaryFund,WorkingPaper, no.04/127.
KALIRAI, H. – SCHEICHER, M. (2002): Macroeconomic Stress Testing: Preliminary Evidence
for Austria. Austrian National Bank, Financial Stability Report, no. 3.
KUPIEC, P. (2001): Stress Testing and Financial Sector Stability Assessments: A Basic Recipe
for an FSAP Stress Test. Washington, International Monetary Fund – mimeo.
LAUBSCH, A. (2000): Stress Testing. Chap. 2: “Risk Management, APractical Guide”. New York,
RiskMetrics Group, 2000.
National Bank of Hungary (2003): Report on Financial Stability, June 2003.
National Bank of Poland (2004): Financial Stability Review, First Half of 2004.
National Bank of Slovakia (2004): Financial Stability Report for 2003.
Norges Bank (2004): Financial Stability, 2004:1. June 2004.
SAUNDERS, A. (2000): Financial Institutions Management: A Modern Perspective. 3rd Ed. 
McGraw-Hill, Boston, 2000.
SEKERKA, B. (1998): ¤ízení bankovních rizik. Praha, Profess Consulting, 1998.
SORGE, M. (2004): Stress-testing Financial Systems: an Overview of Current Methodologies.
BIS Working Paper, no. 165.
SUNDARARAJAN, V. – ENOCH, C. – SAN JOSÉ, A. – HILBERS, P. – KRUEGER, R. –
MORETTI, M. – SLACK, G. (2002): Financial Soundness Indicators: Analytical Aspects and
Country Practices. Washington, International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper, no. 212.
Sveriges Riksbank (2004): Financial Stability Report, 2004:2.
WELLS, S. (2002): UK Interbank Exposures: Systemic Risk Implications. Bank of England, Fi-
nancial Stability Review, December 2002.
WORRELL, D. (2004): Quantitative Assessment of theFinancial Sector: AnIntegrated Approach.
IMF Working Paper, 2004, no. 153.
439 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 9-10
s_418_440  13.10.2005  17:56  Stránka 439SUMMARY 
JEL Classification: G21, G28, G29
Keywords: financial soundness – financial systems – stress testing
Stress Testing of Banking Systems
Martin ČIHÁK – International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. (mcihak@imf.org)
In response to the increased financial instability of many countries in the 1990s,
policy makers sought a better understanding of the vulnerabilities of financial sys-
tems and of measures that could help prevent financial crises. A key technique for
quantifying financial-sector vulnerabilities is stress testing. This paper surveys
the literature in the developing field of stress-testing financial systems and in par-
ticular banking systems.
Stress tests are useful because they provide a quantitative measure of the vul-
nerability of a financial system to risk factors. This can be useful in combination with
other analyses to draw conclusions about the overall stability of a financial system.
The value added of macroprudential stress tests derives from their forward-looking
macroeconomic perspective, their focus on the financial system as a whole, and their
uniform approach to the assessment of risk exposures across institutions. The value
added of stress tests can be particularly high if tests are performed regularly and
their results analyzed over time.
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